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The African National Congress Comes Home
Tom Lodge
Two years of legal existence have enabled the ANC to acquire 900 branches, 500
000 signed-up members, a 20-storey office block in central Johannesburg, a
fresh leadership, a democratic constitution, an elaborate administration, and
an annual income which in 1990 topped R90-million. Its homecoming is
consequently a story of considerable if uneven achievement.
In February 1990, the ANC's leaders were suddenly confronted with the
challenge of adapting an authoritarian and secretive movement formed by the
harsh exigencies of exile to the requirements of a South African environment
shaped by the tumultuous politics of the 1980s. Two years later, the process
of changing the ANC into a organisation geared to open and democratic forms
of popular mobilisation is far from complete. In 1992 the ANC still struggles
to absorb and reconcile the experiences of three generations of leadership:
the elderly veterans who emerged from decades of confinement on Robben
Island; the middle-aged managers of an insurgent bureaucracy; and, finally,
the youthful architects of the most sustained and widespread rebellion in
South African history.
The exile organisation
To understand what the ANC has become in 1992, it is essential to know what
kind of organisation it was in 1990. One way of doing this is through
investigating its institutional structures and internal procedures. This is
the approach which characterises most studies of the exile ANC during the
1980s.1 This literature depicts a most intricate and elaborate organisation
which can be represented as an embryonic state - a *government-in-waiting1.
It resembled a state in several respects. It ordered the lives of members of a
12 000-strong2 exile community and while doing so performed many of the
functions of a modern government. For example, on the ANC's 3 400 acre estate
in Morogoro, Tanzania, three schools, a cluster of administrative buildings, a
hospital, a furniture factory, a farm and suburban rows of ranch houses
provided for the needs of 2 500 South Africans, as well as detachments of
Cuban doctors, Nigerian and Swedish nurses and Unesco teachers, not to mention
1 500 pigs and a herd of dairy cattle.3 This community existed quite apart
from those which neighboured it in this sparsely populated part of Tanzania,
subject to its own governance, laws, and financial provisions. In many Third
World countries, ANC leaders were treated with the same courtesies as visiting
heads of government and its officials were accorded partial or full diplomatic
status; indeed by 1990 its 40 "embassies1 reflected a more widespread foreign
* representation' than was maintained by the South African government. With its
diplomats, its flag, its press, its radio, its army and its autonomy in
regulating the lives of its "citizenry1, to many onlookers the ANC appeared a
polity in miniature.
Researchers who tried to identify the internal dynamics of this polity
emphasised its formal structure, decision-making processes, and communications
systems. The ANC in the 1980s was an intensely militarised body. The greater
proportion of its recruits from 1976 underwent military training and served as
guerillas in South Africa or counter-insurgent fighters in Angola. The
best-developed parts of the ANC's organisation were those concerned directly
with military matters. Between 1976 and 1990 a shifting hierarchy of appointed
committees supplied a command structure and lines of communication for
Umkhonto weSizwe combatants. A revolutionary council (renamed in 1983 the
politico-military council) laid down overall strategy. This was interpreted
operationally by Umkhonto's military headquarters. Directives would be
communicated to regional command structures in "forward areas' (Botswana,
Lesotho, and Swaziland/Mozambique). These would be translated into tactical
objectives by the "machineries1 which controlled the activities of the
guerilla units within different areas of South Africa. In 1985 the ANC
established regional and area politico-military committees ("senior organs' or
PMCs) in an effort to correct a persistent problem - weak co-ordination
between guerilla actions and underground political work. In fact the ANC's
specifically political network inside South Africa remained poorly developed
until the close of the 1980s. It was unable to achieve its strategic aim of
promoting a generalised insurrection. This would have required much more
precise orchestration of its insurgent warfare with the wider popular
opposition led by the United Democratic Front and the trade unions. In any
case, the scope of guerilla activity was much too limited for this; peaking at
281 attacks in 1988 and declining thereafter, it never amounted to more than
"armed propaganda1, as ANC spokesmen today readily concede.4
In an effort to improve the ANC's political presence within the country as
well as to tighten up political/military liaison, a special "president's
committee1 was established in 1987. This dispatched a number of senior leaders
into the country who for the next three years endeavoured to construct
clandestine organisation in Southern Natal and the Transvaal. "Operation
Vula', as it was known, was sufficiently extensive for its achievements to
have been recorded on 4 500 pages of computer files, if we accept the police
claims made when the leading Vula partisans were captured along with their
computer in June 1990. Just before its unbanning, journalists were noting the
efficiency of the ANC's propaganda dissemination: "speeches delivered by
leaders anywhere in the world are freely available in the country in a few
days'.5 Siphiwe Nyanda, one of the Vula leaders, claimed later that "the
approach was not to differentiate between combat and political work1, but his
testimony suggests that the emphasis was on building political structures.6 In
Southern Natal, ANC spokesmen attested later, Vula had established "strong
propaganda units' in all the townships. In the view of Jabu Sithole, chairman
of Vula's Durban network, the literature distributed in 1989 represented a
"crucial input... into the defiance campaign1.7
In addition to its operational structure, the ANC developed a
compartmentalised bureaucracy with various departments clustered around the
three main nodes of authority; the offices of the president, the secretary and
the treasurer. A separate security directorate policed all sections of the
organisation including Umkhonto camps and the Morogoro educational complex. A
parallel political department fielded commissars entrusted with ideological
instruction in military and civilian sections of the organisation alike.
Diplomats, journalists and teachers each had their own administrative
divisions. Compared to its executive departments, the ANC's representative
institutions were rudimentary. In 1985 a national executive committee was
elected; to its 30 members, a further five were co-opted in subsequent years.
Of the 30 elected members, 22 had belonged to the previous executive. Before
the Kabwe consultative conference, the most recent leadership elections were
held in 1959.8 At Kabwe, the ANC committed itself to summoning a
representative conference at least every five years. In addition to whatever
democratic procedures were attached to convening such vconsultative
conferences', elected "zonal1 and regional "political committees1 began
functioning within those sections of the ANC community which lived outside
South Africa itself and the * forward areas'.9 These seem to have been best
developed in at the ANC's Tanzanian school, Somafco, where apparently *a
battery of committees' each day hammered out policy.10
This is the sort of picture which can be assembled from the academic analyses
of the ANC, most of which are broadly sympathetic to the organisation. They
describe a highly structured and intensely regulated organisation in which
internal functions are subject to codified procedures and routinised
processes. It is an ideologically monolithic organisation - disagreements and
debates occur over strategic and tactical choices rather than long-term
aims.11 What unites leaders is essentially more important than anything that
may distinguish them from each other; for example, the extent of affiliation
to the Communist Party is considered inconsequential.12 Such, accounts are not
altogether uncritical, though; for example, they point to the poor
communications which result from sa culture of subterfuge1,13 and they are
sensitive to the highly centralised and authoritarian character of ANC
leadership. On the whole, though, the emphasis is on the organisation's
coherence of purpose, moral integrity and disciplined rule-bound functioning.
A sharply contrasting picture emerges from a more recent literature which is
characterised by its dependence on ANC dissident sources. A series of leaks
from a well-informed source within the ANC supplied the essential information
for a number of revelatory articles in the London newsletter, Africa
Confidential. This material was subsequently incorporated into a book.14 An
emigre Trotskyite journal, Southern African Searchlight, supplied further
insiders' testimony, this time from a group of former participants in an
Umkhonto mutiny. In these sources, power within the ANC is personal rather
than bureaucratic. It is manifest in intradepartmental feuds conducted by the
different administrative bosses: security versus military, military versus
diplomatic, and so on.
Though such feuds may have strategic implications, in their essence they arise
out of the jockeying by different individuals for political paramountcy. In
the dissident literature each boss staffs his own section of the organisation *
with tried and trusted proteges; the organisation's essential inner dynamics
derive from webs of personal loyalties. It is a leadership system which
centres on patronage exercised through the tight control by those who control
money, material resources, passports and jobs. Leadership competition
generates considerable tensions, sharpened by personal animosities and ethnic
jealousies between Zulus and Xhosas. Power is arbitrary, especially when
exercised by the security.organ, Mbokhodo, "the stone that crushes'. Authority
is corrupt, and this is manifest in venality, crime and sexual exploitation.
Though the Africa Confidential reports attach great importance to identifying
communists within the hierarchy, the main fissures within the organisation
cross-cut partly affiliation; indeed some of the most powerful patrons are
non-communists (Umkhonto commander Joe Modise, treasurer Thomas Nkobi, and
Mbokhodo head Mzwai Piliso, for example).
Whereas the academic sympathisers of the ANC accord a central place to the
armed struggle in their narrative of the 1980s, in this version of the ANC's
history the key episode is a 1984 mutiny among Umkhonto units serving against
Unita guerillas near Malanje in central Angola. Fighting against Unita was
unpopular, but the mutiny can also be understood as a response to the harsh
behaviour of Mbokhodo after the detection of a spy network in Umkhonto camps
in 1981. The events of the uprising reached their climax in the takeover of
Pango camp by mutineers and their subsequent defeat by a loyalist Umkhonto
force. The aftermath of the mutiny included public executions, tortures,
beatings and, for most of the mutineers, nearly five years' confinement in the
ANC's prison-camp, Quatro, before their partial rehabilitation in 1988. The
regime at Quatro featured hard and pointless labour, atrocious living
conditions, sadistic brutality and intense personal humiliation, a programme
- the Searchlight writers claim - adapted by KGB trainers from Soviet and East
German prison routines.
In these accounts, the ANC is demonstrably incapable of instituting internal
reforms. A purge of the security department acknowledged that officials had
over-reached themselves but left the essential apparatus intact. Similarly
half-hearted were the efforts to construct democratic checks on the power of
leadership. At the 1985 consultative conference, nominations for national
executive positions had to be ratified by the president and voting was by show
of hands or acclaim by delegates who were, at least in the case of those from
Angola, selected by leadership rather than chosen by rank-and-file.15 Abuses
were halted or corrected only though the more-or-less accidental intervention
of the more courageous humanely-predisposed leaders; Gertrude Shope, head of
the ANC's women's section, for example, succeeded in ending the torture of
mutineers at Pango after she visited the camp.
The Thami Zulu affair, as reported in the British press in 1991,16 tends to
corroborate the picture of authoritarian arbitrariness and personal
factionalism which characterises the ANC of the "dissident1 literature. Thami
Zulu joined the ANC in 1980 while studying at the University of Botswana.
Following his military training in the USSR, he enjoyed a meteoric rise to
commander of Umkhonto's Natal theatre in 1983. In 1988, South African security
police success in penetrating the Swaziland-based regional political-military
committee (RPMC) resulted in a series of disasters including the assassination
of senior personnel and the arrests of contingents of incoming guerillas.
Acting over the heads of Umkhonto's command, Mbokhodo detained Thami Zulu and
a number of other members of the Natal "machinery1. Both Umkhonto commander
Joe Modise and chief of staff Chris Hani on several occasions attempted to
obtain Zulu's release. Zulu was held for 17 months; no evidence was ever
produced to indicate his complicity in any treachery. He was released in
November 1989 and died mysteriously five days later. A post-mortem
subsequently revealed he had been poisoned with pesticide. Both The
Guardian and Africa Confidential attributed Zulu's fall to institutional
animosity between Mbokhodo and Umkhonto and more particularly to the personal
rivalry of Jacob Zuma, then heading security, who had apparently resented both
Zulu's ascendancy, and Umkhonto's chief of staff, Chris Hani, whose protege
Zulu had been.17
These two very different portrayals of the ANC are not impossible to
reconcile. The academic authorities tended to interpret the ANC in terms of
its own intentions and the images the ANC projected outwards. Such an
analysis, however critically astute, can at best be partial. It certainly
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leaves little room for the play of the idiosyncrasies of personalities or the
malfunctioning of bureaucratic structures. The dissenting version gives these
primacy, painting a general picture of tyranny and corruption from an
impressive series of anecdotes.18 But the conclusions seem exaggerated; the
totalitarian terror described in contributions to Searchlight 19 does not
accord with experiences of the mutineers after they had left Angolan prisons.
In Tanzania they were initially welcomed and elected onto a number of
representative bodies despite expressions of disapproval from Mbokhodo.
Nevertheless, the dissident literature represents a substantial indictment of
the silences of the academic authorities. The seamier side of the ANC's
existence in the 1980s reflects an important part of the experience the cadres
brought home with them in 1990-91 together with exile state-building and
guerilla militarism. Subsequent events would demonstrate whether the ANC had
been infected by the factionalism and patronage to the extent claimed by the
dissidents in the narration of the organisation's history in exile.
Coming home
President de Klerk's annulment of prohibition took the ANC by surprise. Even
the recently-released internal leaders were unprepared for the pace of events.
Walter Sisulu, after arriving in Lusaka on 17 January 1990, speculated that
the ANC could be once again legal in South Africa "even by the end of the
year'.20 The lifting of the restrictions occurred at a time when the ANC
appeared to be floundering. On 18 January, Alfred Nzo by mistake read out to a
group of journalists an internal document which with unusual frankness
admitted that "we do not have the capacity within our country to intensify the
armed struggle in any meaningful way1.21 The statement conflicted with a
public pronouncement by Nzo a fortnight before.22
One week later Joe Modise maintained the ANC was still determined to
"escalate1 the armed struggle but confirmed that "some problems' had caused a
reduction of military operations.23 Umkhonto leaders were naturally reluctant
to concede that these problems were anything more than the "logistical1
difficulties caused by the movement of guerillas from Angola, Tanzania and
Uganda. By then, though, it was uncomfortably obvious that Umkhonto's war had
failed to achieve its primary purpose, the generation of a popular
insurrection; and given political changes in the region and the Soviet Union's
predisposition to compromise in Southern Africa, it was unlikely to progress
any nearer to it in the foreseeable future. Reporters visiting Lusaka in
February noted the "chronic inefficiency and general malaise1 characterising
the ANC's offices.24 Morale could hardly have been improved by Mbokhodo's
counter-espionage activities; security chief Jacob Zuma later claimed that the
ANC held 100 people in its new Ugandan detention camp who had "instruction to
sow discord within our forces'.25 A series of brawls involving displaced
Angola guerillas in Lusaka provided an additional pointer to widespread
demoralisation. When Sisulu in Lusaka exhorted the organisation to examine
itself critically, apparently his audience responded with an angry litany of
dissatisfaction about the behaviour of their leaders.26 Clearly, the ANC may
have been unready to come home but its prospects in continued exile were
darkening rapidly.
Bringing the movement back to South Africa was easier said than done; in
February 1990 it was unclear how extensive the government indemnity would be
and which leaders would be permitted to return. While this issue was being
sorted out, the former Rivonia prisoners, together with first generation UDF
leaders Terror Lekota, Popo Molefe, Arnold Stofile and Raymond Suttner
constituted themselves as an internal leadership group (ILG).27 This body,
under the chairmanship of Nelson Mandela, resolved to establish regional
committees which would undertake the task of setting up branches and
initiating recruitment. The ILG effectively assumed the authority which up to
that point had been asserted by mass democratic movement principals. In
anticipation of Mandela's release, a national reception committee, chaired by
Cyril Ramaphosa and including the main UDF notables who had predominated in
the events of 1989, had been formed. Already it was clear that the revival of
mass organisation in the decade preceding the ANC's unbanning had nurtured
several groups of rival claimants to the key positions of authority. Creating
an integrated organisation from the domestic open opposition, the exiles and
the underground was obviously going to be problematic.
For the time being, the ANC resolved to build its structures alongside those
already existing under the aegis of the UDF. The hurriedly-opened headquarters
in Sauer Street nominated "conveners' for the first nine regions, delegating
to them the creation of regional and subordinate bodies.28 Officials were
emphatic that existing UDF affiliates should not be used for these purposes.29
Quite apart from maintaining the front as an insurance against the government
changing its mind about the ANC's freedom, there were issues of deeper
principle as well. As Raymond Suttner put it, the ANC did not want community
organisations to be "swallowed up' and civics, womens' and cultural groups
should retain their independent identity. The Eastern European experience had
important lessons for those who sought to transform these bodies into
transmission belts of ANC influence.30 Moreover, civics had "a breadth of
politics1 which the ANC could not aspire to represent.31
As the initial organisation was hastily assembled, exiles began arriving from
Lusaka. The first NEC member, Jacob Zuraa, disembarked at Jan Smuts on
21 February, accompanied by members of the ANC's legal and security
departments. A second contingent flew in for talks with the government in
April; this group included Alfred N2o, Joe Slovo, Thabo Mbeki and Joe Modise.
By June the organisation's centre of gravity was once again where it had been,
30 years before - in Johannesburg.
Subsequent developments are best discussed thematically. The next four
sections of this review will examine in turn the evolving character of the
ANC's leadership; the efforts to recruit and organise a mass following;
strategy, action and policy making; and the continuing exile activities. A
conclusion will attempt to evaluate the degree to which the ANC has succeeded
in adapting to the environment of democratic mass politics which was created
by the popular upheavals of the 1980s.
Leadership
Notwithstanding the rhetoric of collective leadership and the ANC's efforts
since 1990 to develop constitutional procedures, any discussion of
contemporary ANC leadership must begin with one man, Nelson Mandela.
Mandela's dominant role is attributable to several factors: the leadership
vacuum in Lusaka in 1990 caused by Oliver Tambo's illness and the unassertive
quality of his immediate deputies; the slow pace of organisation building in
the months following the ANC's legalisation; the tensions between the
different groups of notables: exiles, Robben Islanders, trade unionists, and
UDF officials; Mandela's own role in initiating negotiations well before his
release; and, most important of all, the extraordinary cult developed around
his name and reputation in South Africa and overseas during the 1980s. This
cult was partly a consequence of the inevitable personification of politics
which takes place when newspapers and television interpret complex events to a
popular audience, but it was also the result of the government's systematic
efforts to thwart the development of successive generations of political
leadership after its suppression of black opposition in the 1960s. In justice
to Mandela, his own intelligence, courage and honour were crucial in
sustaining the moral authority his name commanded. Not all UDF leaders were
comfortable about the devotional quality of Mandela's public following,
though; they resisted, for example, the efforts of Mrs Mandela to promote the
Release Mandela Campaign as the UDF's "core* organisation,32 and Reception
Committee spokesmen emphasised after Mandela's release that he was an ordinary
member of the ANC, subject to its discipline and conventions.
Mandela belongs to a generational elite which from a very early stage in its
development assumed a dominant political role. The ANC in the 1950s was weakly
constituted; strong and forceful personalities had to compensate for
organisational inadequacies. In the 1950s, leaders did not attempt to reflect
consensus through consultation, they led. Mandela's aristocratic origins and
family circumstances may also have contributed to an authoritarian element in
his personality; his daughter, Maki, told journalists just before his release,
*My father is a domineering fellow, who feels he has to make decisions for
everybody. You have to do things his way. You can't challenge1.33 Of course,
Mandela is too complex and too private a man to be easily characterised and
his public behaviour often demonstrates an aversion to personality cults. The
impersonal quality of the interviews he gives are a reflection of this: "When
he spoke he rarely gave views from a personal perspective. He did not see
himself in isolation - even on personal matters'.34 To be sure, Mandela's
frequent use of "we1 rather than "I'35 can often sound magisterial rather than
self-effacing, but the intention which underlies it is probably genuinely
modest. ,
Whatever his own inclinations may have been, Mandela as ANC deputy president
(a post to which he was appointed in March 1990), was swiftly surrounded by
people who encouraged a Caesarean manner. As the ANC consolidated its
bureaucracy, observers noted that the "Mandela factor (was) crucial in the
scramble for posts' with the majority of them being filled by exiles or people
close to the Robben Islanders: "uncritical supporters of the old guard1.36
Acquiring proximity to the great man was one way for exiles or old guardists
to even the scales against the younger trade union and UDF leaders whose
political influence was solidly based on the densely woven organisations of
the 1980s. The Robben Islanders brought back from their prison experience an
especially rigid and exclusive hierarchical form of authority which critics
likened to a system of chieftaincy.37 Those UDF leaders who were active in
1989 were particularly disadvantaged as a consequence of their forthright
condemnation early that year of Mrs Mandela's supposed complicity in the
misdeeds of her bodyguards. The evolving mode of presidentialism began to be
outwardly discernible in the course of 1990; for example Mandela, on returning
from his expeditions overseas, would be met by the entire ANC executive lined
up at Jan Smuts Airport.38
Mandela's foreign journeys were vital in generating cash donations needed to
keep the organisation functioning but during his absence people appeared
reluctant to make decisions. Commentators pointed to *the development of a
dependency syndrome as a consequence of Mandela's stature within the
movement'.39 Trade unionists complained of the "commandist, top-down1 fashion
in which Nelson Mandela and the exiles managed the ANC's affairs (and those of
its allies).40 Overbearing management seemed to be matched by an intellectual
insensitivity for the wider concerns of democracy. Poor advice and naive
speechwriters may have been responsible for such potential embarrassments as
Mandela's praise for Fidel Castro's "love for human rights', his public
acceptance in Libya of the Gadaffi International Prize for Human Rights, and
his angry defence in Kenya of Daniel Arap Moi against critics of one-party
rule,41 but they reflect also an old fashioned "Third Worldism' at odds with
the ANC's professed commitment to constitutionalism.42
The most alarming symptoms of the political degeneration which can result from
charismatic autocracy were evident in the treatment accorded to and the role
played by Mrs Mandela in the first 18 months of the ANC's reconstruction. At
the time of the ANC's unbanning, Mrs Mandela was beginning again to make
public appearances, a reflection of a growing sentiment among MDM leaders that
she should be afforded a measure of "rehabilitation' from the isolation
imposed on her after the murder by her bodyguards of Stompie Moeketsi, a child
in her care.43 Powerful Lusaka-based officials had never favoured her complete
exclusion from public events and after returning to Johannesburg former exiles
engineered her ascent to a series of senior positions: head of the ANC's
social welfare department (nomination by Alfred Nzo), member of the PWV ANC
regional executive (election by show of hands with Nzo and Nelson Mandela
present),44 and Witwatersrand Women's League chair (elected with a three vote
majority).45 These moves provoked an outcry - more than 100 branches protested
her appointment as the ANC's social work director which seemed especially
inappropriate because of the unanswered questions arising from the Moeketsi
affair. The efforts to promote Mrs Mandela by members of the inner circle
surrounding her husband seemed a particularly blatant instance of a more
generalised favouritism; as one senior unionist put it, "many employees (at
the ANC headquarters) are friends of other people; it has caused a lot of
dissatisfaction'.46
Mrs Mandela's own demeanor during this period was hardly reassuring. She sat
in on a national executive meeting despite the discomfit of certain NEC
members. She made a series of warlike speeches at a time when the ANC was
trying to curb the militarism of sections of its following. She was spotted in
New York on an extravagant shopping spree in which her companions chose to
persuade boutique proprietors not to charge for the outfits she selected.47
Now none of this was particularly reprehensible; her rhetorical excesses
probably delighted as many as she offended, her showy assertiveness might be
welcomed in a movement in which women still tend to be relegated to stoic,
demure and supportive roles, and her ostentation easily forgivable in someone
who for so long had suffered very intense material and emotional hardship. But
her trial for the assault and kidnaping of Moeketsi and the events surrounding
it raised rather more serious issues.
The proceedings themselves, while clearing her of assault, nevertheless showed
Mrs Mandela in a most unflattering light. The most charitable interpretation
of the record is that she failed to protect the children her bodyguards
kidnaped, absenting herself from Soweto without taking sensible precautions
about their welfare. At the very least, she must have been aware that Stompie
Moeketsi and his friends were already receiving rough treatment from members
of her "football club1. As disturbing as the events recounted in the trial was
what was happening outside the courtroom. First, there was a statement by the
ANC in January that the trial was essentially political, that it was "designed
to undermine the ANC's reputation1 and breached the spirit of any agreements
concluded with the government.48 This contradicted an earlier statement in
which the ANC claimed that it sought 'no special treatment1 for Mrs Mandela
now that the charges against her were "in the hands of the court'.49 At the
opening of the trial, high-ranking ANC officials appeared in the public
gallery in what was understood to be a show of support for Mrs Mandela while
outside members of the Winnie Mandela Support Committee wearing ANC insignia
waved banners with the legend "Stop harassing our Mother1. Chris Hani
announced from the United States that if she was jailed the ANC would release
Mrs Mandela as soon as it came to power.50 More serious in its implications
was the disappearance of five of the state's witnesses, youths who had already
given newspapers what they claimed to be first-hand accounts of Mrs Mandela
participating in the beatings of children held by the football club. The ANC
denied it had ordered the abduction of the witnesses but two turned up in
Lusaka claiming they had been brought there by the ANC.51
In the middle of the trial, though, the ANC seemed to shift course. Top
leaders stopped attending. The publicity department and the PWV regional
offices refused facilities to the Winnie Mandela Supporters Committee.52
Nelson Mandela, responding to sentencing and application to appeal, said that
'it is proper to leave the matter in the hands of the court... (T)he case has
no relevance to the negotiations.'53 During the trial the national Women's
League elections were held. Mrs Mandela stood for president against the
incumbent, Gertrude Shope. Albertina Sisulu stood down and advised her
supporters to vote for Shope. Western Cape branches threatened to dissolve
themselves in the event of Mrs Mandela winning. She lost the secret ballot by
400 votes to 196.
The ANC's journal, Mayibuye,54 published a letter criticising the ANC leaders
for "failing to separate the political context of the trial from the trial
itself; the trial, it contended, was "clearly a criminal trial1, not a
political one. This was evidently a view shared by the principal contributors
to International Defence and Aid who refused to allow the use of their funds
in Mrs Mandela's defence.55 As opposition to Mrs Mandela within the
organisation began to coalesce her opponents among the ANC's leadership began
to be identified by the press,56 an indication that highly-placed insiders
were leaking information vigorously. All these events suggest that, imperial
predispositions notwithstanding, the ANC had managed to develop the democratic
reflexes needed to check the readiness of senior courtiers to create a
different set of rules for leaders and their families.
The story is not over, though. Mrs Mandela remains popular amongst youth
leaders and their constituency who share her taste for martial phraseology.
She had traditionally enjoyed the backing of the youth congresses, whose
leader, Peter Mokaba, had promised Nelson Mandela his unqualified loyalty with
the words "We are your storm troopers... (W)e have no qualms in taking
commands from you1.57 Nor should it be supposed that Mrs Mandela's defenders
are limited to Mokaba's storm troopers. She is an tireless campaigner and
regularly appears on platforms in some of the ANC most remote and isolated
branches. She is known for small kindnesses and an infallible memory for faces
and biographical information. In many respects she is a superb politician. She
remains a celebrity abroad, especially in the United States where she
continues to be feted, in the words of Julie Belafonte, as "a wonderful role
model for women'.58 She received a respectable share of the votes in the July
1991 national executive elections. She continues to head the ANC's social
welfare department. Mrs Mandela remains an influential figure. Meanwhile, the
missing witnesses remain hidden.
It would hardly be fair, though, to blame all the manifestations of autocratic
leadership on the mistakes made by Nelson Mandela. Though Cosatu officials
complained that the "top-down' style of ANC decision making was "very
different from the MDM',59 not all the problems were new ones. Though it was
true that the UDF had a strong ideological commitment to grounding its
decision making in "community-wide consultation1,60 a doctrine taken over from
the trade union movement, its leaders did not always practice what they
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preached. In 1987, RMC leader Aubrey Mokoena denounced the activities of a
"cabal1 which he said functioned within the UDF's national and regional
committees, a group which confined decision making to a very select circle and
otherwise stifled debate. Two internal commissions proved to be inconclusive
and failed to satisfy Mokoena who in 1989 made a second emotional speech about
the cabal, accusing its members of being the treasonable authors of a document
which advocated speedy negotiations, and which attacked Peter Mokaba, the
president of the South African Youth Congress (Sayco). The document suggested
that Mokaba's followers were out of control and that the Sayco president did
not understand the dynamics of negotiation politics.61 By themselves,
Mokoena's charges might not have been very persuasive. They had a racial
dimension - the cabal's identified members were mainly Indian - and might
reasonably have been perceived to express the rancour of a slighted leader.
And if the alleged cabal was saying that the youth were out of control then it
was only echoing a view which was widely shared: Walter Sisulu himself in 1990
noted with alarm that 'many of the youngsters are not really interested in
negotiations', appearing to endorse the observation of Murphy Morobe (a
supposed cabal member) that "for many of the youth the struggle has meant
simply shoot your way to Pretoria'.62 Nor was having reservations about Peter
Mokaba's sagacity a reliable indication of treachery. But the cabal
allegations were not limited to a few wild speeches by Aubrey Mokoena. In
November 1990 the ANC's Natal regional executive began an investigation of
cabalism in Natal in response to an allegedly 900-page memorandum composed by
seven Robben Island prisoners, including Ebrahim Ismail Ebrahim, and relating
to events over the second half of the 1980s. Again, Indian Congress office
holders were at the centre of accusations.63 The contents of the memorandum
were not made public but an interview with a Natal Indian Congress (NIC)
member who claimed to have belonged to the cabal supplied substance to the
charges. The interview describes a small core claiming to function in a
"democratic centralist1 fashion, operating as a tightly disciplined caucus and
leading by decree. Accomplished in stheory', professing a "scientific1
Marxism, and ostensibly well connected with the exiles, they claimed a
monopoly of understanding of the "correct line1 and were able to isolate or
marginalise people who disagreed with them, labeling them as "workerist1 or
"racial capitalist1. Cabal members also apparently were antagonistic to young
activists who wanted to join the underground,64 though they were most tolerant
of the youthful bullies who laid down their "line'.65
>3L.
Even if these accusations were overdrawn and unfair, clearly high-handed
and undemocratic decision making characterised sections of the UDF. Nor
was this confined to factions within national and regional leadership. At
a lower level, UDF officials allowed and sometimes sanctioned the violent
and coercive behaviour of youth congress activists. While it was true that
through its rhetoric and parts of its practice the UDF promoted within its
constituency a moral sensitivity to democratic values, it by no means
always upheld them. It is likely that many of the imperfections of its
experience were carried over into the ANC; by early 1991, according to
Mayibuye,66 most full-time UDF officials were absorbed in ANC
duties.
As we have seen, though, "commandism* encountered substantial resistance.
Rank-and-file dissatisfaction did not stem only from oligarchy; due to its
unfamiliarity with local conditions and its reluctance to delegate
responsibility, the bureaucracy was notoriously inefficient. It left
letters unanswered, including those arriving from foreign heads of state,
its members failed to keep appointments, and it often seemed unconcerned
with the problems of its followers; for example, in November 1990, members
of the ANC working group on the release of prisoners promised on four
occasions to visit people on death row and each time did not turn up.67
This last issue was a particularly sensitive one; since September there
had been only 66 releases and the ANC's leaders were being blamed by
rank-and-file for not maintaining sufficient pressure on the government.
The December "consultative* conference allowed plenty of chances for these
criticisms to be voiced; as Nelson Mandela noted somewhat plaintively
during his closing speech, for him and his colleagues "one of the most
disappointing features of the conference was that there was hardly a word of
praise1.
The national conference of July 1991 supplied the opportunity for ordinary
members to institutionalise checks on office holders. In fact the skirmishing
began before the conference when headquarters circulated a draft constitution
which enlarged the national executive from 35 to 128, including 15 co-opted
members, 15 regional chairs, two youth league officers, and 17 Women's League
representatives. Elections would be held every three years; voting by secret
ballot would be by delegates themselves elected at regional conferences in a
similar fashion- The NEC would meet quarterly and in between its meetings a
full-time paid national working committee chosen by the executive from its
members would assemble every month. In the first draft of the constitution a
number of clauses would have enabled the incumbent NEC to influence the
outcome of the elections of its successor: it would be able to nominate ten
per cent of the voting delegates and also combine with two regions to nominate
candidates (alternatively, candidates would need the nomination of three
regions). It could additionally propose by itself up to 75 candidates. The
expansion of the executive was widely perceived as a way to ensure that most
of the existing NEC members would retain their seats- In revisions to the
constitution, the regions cut these aspirations down to size, reducing the
membership from 128 to 90, 50 of whom would elected, doubling regional
ex-officio representation, allowing provision for only three co-options
between elections and eliminating the nomination powers of the executive.. 68
One-hundred-and-twenty-six candidates appeared in the final list at the
conference. Of the 50 elected candidates, 15 had belonged to the previous
executive. The 21 former NEC members who were not re-elected tended to be the
most elderly figures or virtually unknown functionaries. Twenty-five exiles
remained the largest bloc within the elected membership. Seven
ex-long-term prisoners gained places. Sixteen former UDF or labour leaders
were also voted in and this group was augmented by the regional chairs and
secretaries who were frequently drawn from the front's structures or those of
the unions. With Cyril Ramaphosa's election to secretary general, the
"internal1 leaders' influence within the ANC hierarchy was significantly
extended. Returned exiles, though, were to predominate within the working
committee, taking 14 of the 20 ordinary positions and the posts of chairman
(specially created for Oliver Tambo), deputy secretary general (Jacob Zuma),
and treasurer (Thomas Nkobi). Mandela was elected as president with Walter
Sisulu as his deputy. Communists did well in the elections, though
proportionately they are now less preponderant within the ANC's chief
leadership than they were before the conference. They are well represented in
regional executives. Eleven out of the 26 NWC members are active in the party
but with the SACP itself showing less and less inner cohesion and with a
proliferation of publicly ^lapsed' communists,69 it becomes questionable
whether the SACP can operate in the factional manner claimed by its
detractors.
The one public revelation of manipulative behaviour by members of the NEC and
NWC associated with the party left a final impression of vulnerability rather
than strength. This was at the beginning of August when 12 communists on the
executive, six of them in the NWC, took advantage of Nelson Mandela's absence
to assign portfolios in such a way as to weaken or eliminate more conciliatory
members of the ANC's negotiating team (Thabo Mbeki and Jacob Zuma) while at
the same time awarding to themselves some of the key policy-making
departments.
One effect of their decisions, almost certainly intended, would have been to
place Winnie Mandela's office under the overall authority of Cheryl Carolus,
the director of a newly-created department of health, welfare and human
resources. On returning, Mandela unraveled many of these arrangements,
reinstating Zuma, the dismissed negotiator, placing Mbeki once again at the
head of the team, insisting that the six top office-bearers should belong
ex-officio to all departments and commissions, and transferring Mrs Mandela's
department to the formal ambit of treasurer Thomas Nkobi. If this clumsy
manouevre really represented communist politicking at its most calculatedly
adroit the party's opponents within the ANC have little to fear.70
In the realm of leadership, then, the last two years have witnessed a conflict
between oligarchic and democratic tendencies within the ANC, both of which
seem to be strongly entrenched. After its July conference, though, it has been
much less easy for leadership to select its successors or act autocratically.
This has not yet made the ANC notably more efficiently administered. Mbulelo
Mdledle, a recently returned and thoroughly exasperated Umkhonto cadre had
this to say after encountering the bureaucrats at head office in the second
half of 1991:
"To returnees, the ANC's administrative horror feels something like trying to
fit square pegs into round holes. Officials are always in meetings. Those
with minimal authority have their discretion fettered by policy while those
with a lot of power are, in some instances, abusing their discretion."71
Constitutional changes cannot affect managerial revolutions. Nor has inertia
and muddle been confined to the ANC's Johannesburg headquarters. It is to the
wider dimensions of organisation that we now turn.
Turning followers into members
In April 1990, the ANC optimistically ordered two-and-a-half million
membership cards from the printers. These would be available in exchange for a
R12 annual subscription to all adult members of its following. Rejecting its
pre-1960 subdivision into provincial congresses, the interim leadership group
divided the country into 14 regions and named a xconvener' for each. In early
May, several regional committees had already been appointed and had publicly
launched the ANC in their respective areas with well-attended rallies.
Generally, the pattern was to sign up members before forming branches, either
at the rallies themselves or in some of the better organised centres, in the
Eastern Cape, for example, through door-to-door recruitment.72
Branches were supposed to have a minimum of 1 000 members but many were much
larger and for practical purposes were subdivided into neighbourhood zones.
After .a reasonably brisk start the pace of recruitment and branch formation
fell well behind expectations. Two years later, a large stock of membership
cards remained unsold. The table below uses the publicly available figures to
chart the growth of the ANC's organised following:
Source
Mayibuye, March 1990
FM 28 Sept 1990
FM 26 Oct 1990
WIP, Nov 1990
Natal, WM, 23 Nov 1390
ST, 9 Dec 1990
Obs, 14 April 1991
Cit, 17 June 1991
BD, 6 Nov 1991
These statistics would be really rather impressive if they indicated the scale
and pace of the ANC's disciplined, motivated and effectively mobilised
following. They do not, though. Part of the problem has been the purposeless
quality of the process. As a contributor to Mavibuye lamented in late 1990:
sThere has been, in general, no clear and coordinated programme to involve
people as they join in the life of the branch1. The branches were often too
large Kto allow for the direct involvement of members in anything other than
mass meetings'.73 This was partly a reflection of the haste with which these
structures were established; as the table above demonstrates, the number of
branches doubled in three months before December 1990, doubtless in
anticipation of the consultative conference.74
But quite apart from any problems arising from the speed with which branches
were assembled, there was a deeper difficulty arising from the lack of a. clear
vision of what branches should actually do once they existed. Should they
duplicate the role of the civics and concern themselves primarily with local
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attending civic meetings in which everyday issues were discussed rather than
the consideration of 'abstract policy questions1 which predominated at some
ANC gatherings.75 Certain civics began issuing their own membership cards
- possibly deliberately competing with the ANC, for they had not previously
given cards to their supporters. People liked acquiring cards, and the civic
ones at R2 each were much cheaper than the ANC cards.76
In 1991, ANC officials disagreed over whether ANC branches should take up
community issues. Gugile Nkwinti, a former UDF leader in the Eastern Cape,
felt that local organisations should not be displaced by an ANC which subsumed
their functions; though it was true that UDF affiliates "had been used by some
activists as a base for undermining the ANC, if the front's substructure
disappeared civil society would be impoverished.
With the likelihood of the ANC becoming a governing party, independent
organisations were needed to perform "watchdog* functions.77 Blade Nzimande, a
social psychologist at the University of Natal and a member of the SACP
(writing from a province in which the front had been weak historically),
disputed this. ANC branches themselves should assume "watchdog1 functions and
promote community issues: if they did not do this, what should they do
otherwise? Given the civics1 popularity there was a "danger of them emerging
as alternative power centres to the national movement'.78 These concerns about
the relationship of ANC branches to civics and the local roles ANC branches
should play were very evident in townships around Pretoria. In Atteridgeville,
the residents' association was a most effective force with its 15 area
committees (including a migrant workers' hostel committee), weekly meetings,
and effectively-conducted local campaigns around electricity tariffs and
similar concerns. ANC members were conspicuous in the
Atteridgeville-Saulsville Residents Organisation (Asro), but despite their
misgivings honoured its independence. Former UDF supporters in Asro, though,
were now saying they were "neutral forces' interested only in local matters.
Meanwhile, PAC adherents complained that the civic had effectively excluded
them from its leadership. In retribution, they formed a separate "liaison
committee in competition with Asro which began conducting its own negotiations
with the provincial authorities over electricity charges. ANC officials felt
that allowing the civic an autonomous existence severely compromised the ANC1 s
own popular appeal. Their feelings were neatly summed up by Glenda Daniels, a
reporter with Work In Progress:
"What will ANC branches address once all political prisoners have been
released and all members have discussed what a constituent assembly and an
interim government mean? Many ANC members are tired of marching, chanting
slogans and discussing relatively abstract issues such as interim government
which they have given up trying to fathom anyway. ANC branches have been left
with very little activity to keep them alive."79
From the perspective of the ANC's national leadership, the main function of
the branches was to give substance to the ANC's authority and leverage at the
negotiation table. This did not give branches very much more to do than merely
exist and periodically participate in limited demonstrations of the extent of
the ANC's active support. For despite its repeated disclaimers, the ANC was
reconstituting itself as a political party - a force geared to electoral
competition - rather than the broad multi-functional movement which the UDF
had embodied so powerfully.80 As Mavibuve noted in its issue of July 1991,
It,
leadership had a tendency to view negotiations "as the main terrain of
struggle* and see everything else as secondary. An "ANC activist1 was
similarly critical in October. "Ordinary people1, he or she suggested, "were
no longer at the centre of our thinking1. Today, "mobilisation by decree is
the norm1; in the event of a campaign, "a leaflet issued from central office
was (usually) the sum total of preparations'.81 The inept appointment of one-
time exile security chief, Mzwai Piliso, as head of the national campaign
committee confirmed the impression of a leadership which was insensitive to
the requirements of grassroots activism. To be sure, not all senior leaders
eschewed participatory politics. Former Vula operative Ronnie Kasrils was
amongst those senior figures who were becoming increasingly critical of the
way in which negotiation politics was distancing the ANC from its popular
base. The ANC should nurture rather than neglect its heritage of "mass
struggle', he argued, for "by developing this strength we can transform the
negotiation process into a democratic transfer of power to the people'.
Kasrils' concerns were not limited to national negotiations; he felt the
impact of community struggles was "being defused through negotiations at the
local level where we are weakest', a view which reflected once again the ANC's
distrust of community organisations over which it had no direct control.82
Kasril's advocacy of negotiations in which "mass struggle is the key1 was
essentially adversarial, though. For it to become plausible the ANC would have
had to be much stronger than it was and the government far weaker. Though the
ANC's 8 January 1991 policy statement used comparable language, contending
that "mass involvement1 in negotiations was "vital1, Mandela had already made
it quite clear that talks with the government would continue behind closed
doors and not always openly, as his critics demanded; the nature of the
negotiation process required this. Carefully-qualified language in the
8 January NEC statement made provision for future shifts in the ANC's
prescriptions for an elected constitutional assembly;83 clearly the principal
ANC negotiators had little faith in imposing their views on the government
through orchestrated "mass struggle1.84
Even if they had wanted to, by early 1991 the ANC was in poor shape
organisationally. In many areas on the Witwatersrand its support had been
immobilised by the violence accompanying Inkatha's attempted expansion along
the Reef.
The ANC's inability to protect people was having a corrosive effect on its
local credibility. On the East Rand, members of locally assembled "defence
units' told journalists that they had asked the ANC to provide them with guns,
expressing disappointment that no guns had as yet been delivered.85 Though
former Umkhonto cadres filled most of the posts in units set up in Soweto,86
Umkhonto leaders openly acknowledged that they had neither the resources nor
the organisation to supply adequate protection in all the areas threatened by
Inkatha supporters.
Shortages of resources seems to have been a pervasive problem, not just
affecting Umkhonto. At first hearing, the statistics supplied by
treasurer Nkobi in July 1991 suggest the ANC has a substantial budget.
Its income between February and December 1990 totalled R90-million.
Ninety per cent of this sum was derived from grants and donations,
mostly from foreign countries. Sweden remains the most important donor
as it was during the 1980s, Membership fees represented only five per
cent of income. The ANC owns a substantial quantity of real estate,
including houses and offices in Europe and America as well as its base
in Tanzania; together these constitute a ^portfolio1 with a notional
value of R593-million.87 Salaries in 1990 cost the ANC 20 per cent of
its income and purchasing an office block in Johannesburg used up
R20-million.88 At the beginning of 1991, the ANC faced the prospect of
having to bankroll the repatriation of its exiles. The cost of their
transport, health needs, and accommodation in South Africa was projected
at R160-million. Aside from this expense, the day-to-day operational
costs of its administration were estimated at R4-million a month.89
By September 1991, the ANC was no longer able to afford the modest
R2 225 resettlement grants it had awarded each repatriated exile.90 This
is hardly surprising; in exile the ANC's non-military budget totaled
$50-million, $30-million in the form of supplies, equipment and
personnel. With the collapse of the eastern bloc many of the in-kind
contributions have ceased; it is likely the ANC's income today is in
real terms rather less than it was in exile. Moreover, in South Africa,
it has to pay for many services it used to receive free from African host
governments.
It is of course possible that considerable sums are wasted. In Natal, for
instance, European Community funding was halted because it was discovered that
money was being expended on salaries for allegedly incompetent officials
rather than being used on the projects for which they were given.91 In the
Western Cape, there was apparently considerable discontent resulting from the
"hijacking1 of full-time positions in UDF structures by returning exiles.92
The ANC-sponsored Economic Policy Research Unit was finally disbanded after
spending over R3-million of donor money, mainly on air fares.93 Another
probability is that resources were concentrated at the Johannesburg
headquarters. Here, the %sense of entitlement1 felt by exiles for first claim
to any paid posts has been a particular problem. 94 Meanwhile, regions have
persistently complained of insufficient numbers of full-time officials who
could visit branches regularly and facilitate communications between them.95
Shortages of human and financial resources are not by themselves sufficient to
explain why the ANC often seems to have a weak local presence. With less
material support from outside,96 the UDF at its peak could be much more
pervasive. As we have seen, effective competition with the civics is another
factor which detracts from the ANC's ability to sustain a vital branch
culture. As well as this, though, in certain areas the ANC's weaknesses may be
attributable to the fashion in which it has been constituted. In the Eastern
Transvaal, for example, the region chose as its chairman a recently returned
exile working at headquarters in Johannesburg, Matthew Phosa. He had departed
South Africa in the early 1980s leaving behind his partnerhsip in a firm of
Nelspruit attorneys, phosa's election was ostensibly surprising, given his
continueing absence from the region. Sources suggest that the real power
within the Eastern Transvaal ANC lies in the hands of those who helped
"convene1 the organisation. This group had emerged from the Sayco network.
Before the regional executive elections, there were allegations that ANC
"branches1 were set up, in at least one case three in a single village, after
bulk sales of membership cards to traders. In many districts the ANC's
organisation rested on a substructure of of youth cohorts mobilised around
local "big men', effectively reproducing customary patterns of patronage.
Sitting on today's regional executive are a number of old bantustan notables
including an MP who underwent a political conversion after losing his seat and
a former chief recently deposed by his community. Also detracting from the
leadership's credibility has been its propensity to call stay-at-homes without
consultation over issues of limited local concern; the protest in 1991 against
Margaret Thatcher's visit was a case in point.97 In one town, the ANC branch
chairman doubles as the president of the civic. To enhance attendance he
combines meetings of both organisations. If he began with the civic's agenda,
people left before any ANC business. Reversing the order of the programme was
no use, most people would not arrive until it was the civic's turn.
In the Northern Transvaal, there has been a proliferation of organisation with
civics springing up alongside ANC branches - again suggesting that the two
draw their most active commitment from different constituencies. In the 1980s,
Azaso's Turfloop branch was energetic in setting up youth groups in
surrounding villages, and today the ANC's Youth League has many supporters in
this region.98 ANC policy, according to one of its organisers, former Umkhonto
cadre Calvin Khan, is to "go along with any homeland leader that accommodates
the organisation'.99 In Venda the ANC held its launching rallies with the new
ruler, former security policeman Brigadier Ramushwana, as guest of honour. As
in the east, civil servants and entrepreneurs feature conspicuously in
Northern Transvaal ANC structures. The largest concentration of members was in
Thohoyandou, and according to convener Joyce Mabadufhasi, Venda civil servants
and police were especially keen to join.100
The evolving symbiotic alliances between the ANC and rural elites are not
conducted only at a regional or local level. Chris Hani's strong personal
relationship with Transkei's General Bantu Holomisa is at least one instance
of a national leader developing a regional political base through constructing
such linkages. Hani, though, it must be remembered, played a personal role in
assembling an underground ANC in Transkei during the 1970s and 1980s and his
local standing also stems from strong loyalties to him.101 He has an
impressive record, unusual among the former exile leaders, for being a
tireless worker at the "grassroots level1.102 His rival, Joe Modise, is
reputed to be cultivating a series of clients in the Transvaal countryside,
including Rocky MalebaseNetsing, leader of the 1987 Bophuthatswana coup
attempt, and since July 1991 a member of the ANC's executive.
Of course, one can reasonably expect ANC organisation to be socially uneven in
those rural areas in which it never developed a strong presence historically.
In such circumstances dependence on and adaption to existing patterns of
political relationships are understandable, in urban areas, though, the ANC's
following should be more broadly based, given the stronger organisational
culture which developed around unions and civic organisations in the 1980s.
Here, though, as we have seen, there are tensions between the surviving
community organisations and the ANC and even in the cities, according to' a
Mavibuye correspondent, much work needed to be done if the ANC is "to rectify
its image as an organisation which was predominantly composed of youth1.103 At
the July 1991 conference, Mandela expressed concern at "the low level of
success we are making in drawing whites, coloureds and Indians into the
organisation*. He was also alarmed at the ANC's overwhelmingly working-class
character. The conference resolution, accordingly, urged the conducting of
Moor-to-door campaigns and home visits, especially in the middle classes of
all communities1.104
Strategy, action and policy making
For much of 1990, ANC activists were chiefly preoccupied with the formation of
organisational structures as well as summoning the public events which
launched them. This task, together with preliminary negotiations with the
government and the violence which accompanied Inkatha's expansion, distracted
the ANC's leaders from any sustained effort to mobilise their popular
following in a systematic fashion. In different localities in Natal and on the
Rand, Umkhonto cadres were active in helping to form defence units,105 but in
many areas "there (was) not any discernible input by the ANC... where defence
structures existed1.106 In truth, as ANC spokesmen sometimes conceded,
Umkhonto's network had never been sufficiently extensive: "In reality there
has never been a people's war... (S)truggle remained largely at the level of
armed propaganda'.107 ANC officials warned against inflated expectations that
Umkhonto could protect communities.108 The guerillas were, in any case, in
Mandela's words, "confined to barracks'.109 Turning instead to the battalions
of labour, the ANC orchestrated an impressive political response to the
violence with its call, in conjunction with Cosatu, for an ^Isolate Buthelezi'
stayaway on 2 July. Despite public misgivings expressed by Archie Gumede,
doyen notable of the Natal Congress, and notwithstanding opposition from the
PAC and Nactu which complained they were not consulted properly, and contrary
to the expectations of the Durban press, the call was heeded by three million
workers, closing most of the factories in Natal and Port Elizabeth. The event
was a telling reminder of the potency of the nationalist/labour alliance and
of the limits of Inkatha's authority even on its home ground, but it did not
nothing to halt the fighting.
In October 1990, the SACP's newsletter, Umsebenzi. published a tartly worded
editorial criticising the absence of "solid strategic planning1, the
substitution of "organisation building' for "mass struggles, mass campaigning,
and mass mobilisation', and the tendency for "future-gazing1 conferences to
"blind us all to the real struggles on the ground to day... The broad masses
must not become mere spectators', Umsebenzi urged. "If they become spectators
then our negotiating hand is drastically weakened1.
This editorial echoed sentiments which were widely voiced and which rose to a
crescendo at the December 1990 consultative conference. A series of toughly
worded resolutions reflected the discontent felt within ANC branches: a
programme of mass action should lend force to demands that the government
should accelerate the release of prisoners and the indemnifying of exiles;
public demonstrations should accompany the opening of parliament to herald a
season of militant campaigning for the ANC's chief political demands; an
interim government and an elected constituent assembly; ANC demands should be
backed by ultimatums including the return to guerilla warfare. At the same
time the 1 603 delegates to the conference - most of them under the age of 30,
according to observers - rejected out of hand proposals from Thabo Mbeki and
Oliver Tambo that a more flexible approach should be adopted to sanctions.
Despite the stirring language of the resolutions, a note of caution prevailed
in the decisions taken at and after the conference. The ANC set four
conditions to be met by 30 April: the release of all prisoners, the return of
all exiles, the repeal of security laws, and the ending of political trials.
But in the event of these not being met, the congress would only * consider1
withdrawing from negotiations. Pragmatic sentiments also influenced the
wording of the 8 January NEC anniversary statement which hinted at a readiness
to compromise over an elected constitution-making body; though the ANC
preferred elections the statement allowed for the possibility that an
all-party conference could turn itself into an assembly. Moreover, the notion
of sanctions being "phased* or tied to specific bargaining points bobbed up
again during Mbeki's presentation at the Abuja OAU summit.110 The statement
omitted any reference to nationalisation of the economy.Ill
Nevertheless, "mass action' began as promised with marches in Cape Town and
Pretoria on the day parliament opened. A stayaway was proclaimed on the
Witwatersrand and in the main towns of Eastern Cape. Mayibuye's reporter was
unimpressed: the strike was a flop mainly because Cosatu locals were
approached much to late to communicate effectively with their members, many
ANC branches did not know what was meant to be happening, and school teachers
and students organisations felt that their support had been taken for granted.
Publicity was poor; leaflets reached the regions too late to be used and were
printed in English only. The marches which did take place were ragged and
undisciplined: "our capacity for marshaling and co-ordinating large crowds
still needs to be improved1, and, moreover, "the streets were mostly filled by
the same old activist faces'.112
It was a start, though, and the campaign's managers were determined that
protest "should not be (limited) to one day events'. An ambitious schedule of
activities was drawn up for the first months of 1991 including a door-to-door
signature campaign for the ANC's demands for an elected constitutional
assembly, concentrated efforts to recruit soldiers and police into the
movement, the establishment of branch adult education units, and the
"reorientation of students to a culture of learning1. Of these, the signature
campaign seems to have absorbed most activist energies and it represented a
telling barometer of the ANC ability to mobilise its following. The campaign
started officially on 11 March with rallies. Two weeks later, regional and
national executive members led teams of volunteers into different locations to
collect signatures. Apparently signature drives slackened off in most
localities after a month or so. Though branches were meant to submit reports
of their progress, many failed to comply. Those which did, testified to people
being too frightened to either sign forms or attend meetings; too many known
ANC figures had been the target of Inkatha attacks. The campaign was
reinvigorated after the July conference and Mavibuve began publishing monthly
figures.
The figures, though quite respectable in comparison to historical signature
campaigns in the 1980s, 1950s and 1940s, do not suggest that this was a form
of campaigning which inspired great excitement. The overall tally of
signatures was rather less than the ANC's claims o 7 3 for its own total
membership, though the good response in the Transkei is worth noting and-does
suggest that in one region at least, people collected signatures outside the
ranks of the movement.
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In comparison to the previous year, though, there were
plenty of events to suggest that "mass activity1 once again occupied a
central position in the ANC's agenda. There were a number of marches on or
around 6 April, "Solomon Mahlangu Day1, focused on the release of
prisoners and exiles and subsequent consumer boycotts to protest the
refusal by certain municipal authorities to issue permits for marches.
There were rallies on May Day; these drew 125 000 people in the Eastern
Cape but only 4 000 on the Reef. A second round of protests outside
parliament and elsewhere marked anti-Republic Day; some over-enthusiastic
marchers burned a coffin supposedly containing an effigy of FW de Klerk,
an action from which Albertina Sisulu and Joe Slovo promptly disassociated
themselves. Such happenings may have helped to sustain morale at the
grassroots, but they were hardly forceful or widespread enough to
constitute serious backing for ANC ultimatums.
However, the scale of demonstrations may be unimportant as long as the
actions adhere to an increasingly predictable repertoire and ritual. The
ANC/Cosatu stayaway in November 1991 to combat the imposition of VAT was a
most formidable demonstration of the alliancefs capacity to empty business
districts and factories, but it did not stop the imposition of the tax or
soften its terms. Speeches at the 48th conference drew attention to the
unimaginative routine into which "mass action1 had fallen. Nzo's outgoing
secretariat report set the tone of the criticisms: "We lack enterprise,
creativity and initiative. We are happy to remain pigeonholed within the
confines of popular rhetorical cliches'.113 New types of happenings were
needed: cultural festivals, flower marches to military bases, and so
on.114 The real problem, though, was not the form of protest. Consumer
boycotts and industrial stayaways were extremely effective in the 1980s when
targeted at local grievances. A series of local protests in small towns in
the Northern and Eastern Transvaal in the second half of 1991 continued to
indicate that they still could be. It had always been much more difficult to
induce shifts in central government policy through crowd action and
industrial insurgency; this required very special conditions and a level of
local organisation which the ANC did not yet possess. It is difficult to
imagine that street theatre, rock concerts and flower marches could have made
much of a difference.
The fact was that by mid-1991 the ANC's real capacity for intimidating the
authorities was by deploying the threat of refusing to participate in
negotiations. This was because its expressed willingness to do so was
becoming an increasingly important element in the government's public
credibility both at home and abroad. Events at the end of July 1991
underscored this point. In the wake of disclosures of official covert funding
of Inkatha, De Klerk acceded to Nelson Mandela's demand that Magnus Malan and
Adriaan Vlok should be dismissed from their ministries of defence and police.
It is true that the ANC leader had included in his ultimatum the threat of a
consumer boycott; in fact a boycott had already been instituted in the
Transvaal on 25 July, but outside Pretoria - where local branches had
emphasised grievances arising from electricity tariffs - most shops reported
business as usual.115 Short of bringing back the days of ungovernability.there
was little street activists could contribute as participants in the
"negotiating process1.
The chief importance of the activists (and indirectly perhaps, "the masses')
is not so much supplying the pavement protest during crucial altercations
over the negotiation table, but rather in maintaining pressure on ANC
leadership to hold firm to those policy essentials which would constitute a
programme of radical socio-economic reform. ANC policy formulation deserves a
separate essay by itself; it can only be mentioned in passing here. Since 1990
the organisation has developed an elaborate policy-making apparatus with
specialised units or commissions examining constitutional issues, economic
planning, land reform, women's rights and a host of other issues, even
extending to the destiny in a post-apartheid South Africa of statues and
monuments. In the crucial economic arena, Cosatu has helped to set the
initial parameters. An ANC/Cosatu conference in Harare held in April 1990
prescribed a post-apartheid reconstruction which would be largely
domestically financed, which would restrict capital export, and which would
extend the scope of public ownership. Significantly, though, the
recommendations did not specify nationalisation of the mining industry,
suggesting instead a variety of regulatory measures to improve wages,
disaggregate ownership, and subject marketing to public control.116 Nelson
Mandela, though, emphasised in his early post-release speeches the ANC's
commitment to nationalisation of major industries, stressing that
"Modification of our views in this regard is inconceivable1.117 Mandela was
not at. that time reflecting a view unanimously held within the ANC's
executive; in mid-February 1990, during a break in the NEC's meeting after
Mandela's arrival in Lusaka, a spokesman told journalists that ^nothing in
our constitutional guidelines... makes nationalisation mandatory'.118
Conflicting claims about the ANC's economic intentions have since become
common; to an extent they signify honest confusion among people without
specialist understanding of economics, but also suggest competition for
ascendancy between different sections of the movement. Since the Cosatu/ANC
recommendations, ANC prescriptions have become much more cautious; its land
reform proposals, for example, are careful to exempt commercial property from
redistribution though they still argue the redistribution of farmland should
not be contestable in court. ANC economic strategists now recognise that
foreign investment must play a much greater role than implied in the
relatively autarchic ANC/Cosatu document. In February 1992 Nelson Mandela
returned from an international economic summit apparently persuaded that
nationalisation would damage the prospects for fresh investment- Assembling a
consensus around such views might be a very tough task. In October 1990,
Umsebenzi had warned that
"...our ANC-led alliance is besieged daily with the concerns and worries of
the ruling class... but what about the concerns of the oppressed majority?
These concerns for us must occupy prime place."
In this light, the switch in emphasis in "mass action1 in late 1991 and early
1992 from protests directed at constitutional issues to those more directly
related to poverty may reflect the left's concern, in the words of the
Umsebenzi editorial, that smass demands will more clearly be heard in the
present debates'.
The ANC abroad
With the relocation of its headquarters to Johannesburg the ANC's diaspora has
become marginalised. At the July 1991 conference the "external1 ANC was
at,
represented by 83 delegates, a fraction of the total.119 Of these, most came
from Tanzania and Uganda where the ANC retains educational centres and
military camps. A change of government in Zambia accelerated the scaling down
of the ANC's establishment there; by the end of 1991 the Zambian authorities
were complaining that the ANC's departure had left in its wake a host of
unpaid electricity bills.
Though Umkhonto leaders continued to insist through 1990 that the cadres
"would remain in their trenches awaiting orders from the ANC,120 and despite
the continuing symbolic importance to many of the ANC's younger supporters of
keeping the army intact, with nothing to do in effect the military has been
sidelined. There is still a military headquarters <196> indeed Winnie Mandela
in August 1991 referred to a mysterious "supreme military council1 composed
of 20 people with equivalent authority to the working committee.121 But to
judge from the way in which many members of Umkhonto's senior command have
become full-time politicians, the army's bureaucracy no longer represents a
major locus of decision making. Lower-level underground command structures
seemed to be collapsing, and the politico-military councils were reported to
be no longer functioning by late 1990.122
To judge from delegate representation at the 48th congress, most of the ANC's
soldiers are now in South Africa. Umkhonto held its own conference in Venda
in September 1991, which gave the cadres the opportunity to express their
unhappiness about the way they had seemingly been abandoned. Joe Modise
delivered a report which evoked derisive comment and the two military
headquarters officers who had been appointed as ex-officio representatives on
the ANC NEC were voted down by delegates. The leaders did not enhance their
popularity when they sat at a separate table for every meal.123
As the prospects of resumed guerilla campaigning become less and less likely,
the main concern of Umkhonto's commanders has shifted from maintaining combat
readiness to equipping their soldiers with the skills needed to manage a
regular army. In late 1990 Umkhonto began a programme of fairly selective
recruitment of candidates for officer and pilot training at foreign military
academies. Hani claimed in October that hundreds had left in recent weeks.
Training would last for about three years. The recruits needed to have
matriculated from high school and to be aged between 17 and 25; the
educational requirement would have disqualified much of Umkhonto's existing
rank-and-file though an "upgrading1 programme would also be instituted. Once
trained, the new officers would have to remain outside South African in terms
of the ceasefire agreement.124
In December 1991, Chris Hani announced that the first graduates of Soviet
officer training schemes had returned to their East African bases; in future,
though, most of the cadets would learn their skills in India.
Quite apart from the practical and political importance to the ANC of
preparing its cadres for senior roles in a post-apartheid SADF, "upgrading1
might help to alleviate morale in the Tanzanian and Ugandan camps. In August
1991 Mbokhodo was said to be holding five people at Mazimbu after a stabbing
incident. Relatives of the detainees claimed that Zulu-speakers were losing
posts at Somafco and were being subjected to various types of unpleasantness
after unfounded accusations of being "Inkatha bandits'.125 If these
melancholy reports are true, than clearly it is time for the remaining
population of the ANC's diaspora to come back home.
A story of mixed achievement
As noted at the beginning of this article, the ANC's renaissance as a mass
political party is a story of mixed achievement. It has been extremely
difficult for different generations of leadership to adapt to an unfamiliar
political culture and in certain areas old authoritarian habits persist. But
the narrative of the last two years does not represent an indictment. There is
plenty of evidence to suggest that democratic procedures within the
organisation have been strengthened by events; leaders may continue to make
mistakes but they also demonstrate considerable capacity to learn from them.
Much of the critical reportage of the ANC's organisational shortcomings can be
found in its own publications and statements. Many of the tensions within the
ANC are the consequence of an extraordinary situation in which a movement
schooled in an absolutist climate of insurrection is having to adapt to the
necessary compromises of realpolitik. That it has to do this in the open makes
the process all the more difficult. It remains a vital and lively
organisation, its huge and unruly army of supporters continuing to represent a
following which holds leaders accountable for their actions. Untidy patches
remain, but the ANC looks in better shape than it did two years ago.
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